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Summary 
Taxes play a very important role in any market economy. Taxes influence the distribution of 
income (and wealth) and the allocation of resources, and play an important role in stabilising 
the economy. In transition economies, such as Belarus, the reform of the tax system is 
expected to ensure tax neutrality across all sectors, as well as stable and optimal tax revenues 
to finance the government’s social expenditures. 
This paper focuses on the taxation of agriculture in Belarus. The system of taxation and the 
structure of the government revenues deriving from agriculture are analysed. The tax burden 
on agriculture is disproportionately low compared to agriculture’s share in the GDP. The 
current tax system also leads to a number of distortions and inefficiencies in agriculture itself 
and in allied sectors. These problems are discussed, followed by several proposals for resolving 
them. 
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1. Introduction 
In any market economy, taxes influence many aspects, including the distribution of income 
(and wealth) and the allocation of resources; they also play an important role in stabilising the 
economy. In the agricultural sector tax policy can have important effects on the number and 
sizes of farms, their organisational structures, and the amount and relative mix of land, labour, 
and capital inputs. Moreover, agricultural taxation influences other sectors of the economy as 
well as the macroeconomic balance of the country as a whole. The creation of an efficient farm 
tax structure that will remove old inefficiencies and stop the appearance of new ones should be 
considered as the goal when building a long-term competitive farming sector, which will 
contribute to the general economic development of the country. 
Currently the agricultural sector in Belarus enjoys a highly preferential taxation regime. Farm 
tax structures influence decisions on whether to consume, save, or borrow; they also influence 
choices such as what type of farm to create (legal status, size, etc.), what to produce, or when 
to buy inputs or sell agricultural products. If an alternative tax structure causes fewer 
distortions, yet allows the government to raise sufficient revenue, the economy could produce 
more with the same level of resources. This paper will therefore consider the farm tax system 
with respect to its influence on the overall efficiency of the agricultural sector and on the 
economy as a whole. We will also evaluate the fairness of the farm tax burden. The latter is 
closely related to the issue of farm subsidisation. However, we will consider subsidisation only 
briefly, because the pros and cons of this aspect are discussed elsewhere1. We want to stress 
that this paper does not intend to draft a new tax law for Belarusian agriculture – that is the 
responsibility of lawmakers. Instead, this economic analysis of the farm tax system in Belarus 
is meant to help Belarusian policy makers to look at farm taxation more comprehensively in 
order to design the best possible long-term tax system for agriculture. 
The paper is structured as follows. The second section considers the major taxation options 
available to the agricultural sector, and defines the key issues of tax reform in a transition 
economy. In the third section, the structure of the current tax system in Belarus is presented. 
Section four raises and analyses problems arising out of the current tax structures. Section five 
makes recommendations and concludes. 
2. Tax options and farm efficiency in the long run 
The government can tax agriculture in many different ways. Income, both individual and 
corporate, can be taxed; the state may tax value-added; and finally, land can be taxed. This 
section considers the different tax alternatives available in the field of agriculture, so that we 
will later on be able to evaluate the current farm tax system in Belarus and prepare 
recommendations concerning its future modification. 
2.1. Personal income tax (PIT) 
Personal income is a good measure of personal power to consume and save. Farm employees 
can receive personal income in various forms: (1) wages, salaries, premiums, and other 
employment income; (2) income from private household plots; and (3) gifts, inheritance and 
other irregular income. In transition economies such as Belarus the second type of income 
source plays a very important role for the rural population. Therefore, legislation must 
precisely and comprehensively define income and establish the same rules of taxation for all 
forms of income (otherwise, people will have incentives to change their income sources to 
reduce their personal income tax liabilities). 
An important advantage of PIT is the close link between personal power to consume/save and 
personal liabilities to support the state. PIT is an important source of state income, and it is 
assumed that with economic recovery of the transition economies, it will play an increasingly 
important role. Moreover, PIT works as an automatic stabiliser, since in years of high income 
more PIT is paid and less in years of low income. 
The PIT also has disadvantages such as (1) complex rules of tax assessment and rather large 
direct and indirect costs to the state and to the taxpayers related to assessing and settling tax 
liabilities, (2) the sensitivity of taxpayers to changes in PIT legislation, and (3) the negative 
impact of PIT on saving. The practice of many countries shows that the deducting certain 
                                                          
1 See the previous study by GET “Subsidizing Agriculture in Belarus: Declared Objective and Actual Outcomes”. 
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expenses – such as tax-free allowances, pension contributions, medical costs, life insurance 
premiums, child care expenses, moving expenses, educational costs and certain other 
expenditures – allows an individual to reduce his taxable personal income. 
2.2. Farm (corporate) income taxation 
Traditionally, farm income tax is levied on net income received (accrued) during a specific 
period (profit from the main activity, capital gains, and other incomes). Net income is gross 
income less business expenses. Farm income taxation creates a good opportunity to tax 
returns on capital and to reduce the administrative costs of income taxation (compared to PIT) 
due to the smaller number of taxpayers and the limited variety of farm receipts. This is 
especially important for Belarusian agriculture, where the number of farms at roughly 4800 
(2400 large agricultural enterprises plus 2400 small private farms) is relatively small by 
international comparison (for example, the number of farms in Germany is roughly 400,000 
and in France – 679,800). 
In addition, corporate income tax can be considered as a form of payment by firms for the 
infrastructure that they use, or for the public education system from which they recruit their 
personnel. However, farm income tax also has a significant disadvantage, being in fact a kind 
of penalty for making a profit (of course this is true for the individual income tax, too). If such 
taxation, therefore, is too high and its scale progressive, tax avoidance is encouraged and 
administering the tax can become extremely complicated. Therefore, the introduction and 
operation of a farm income tax requires special care to ensure minimum distortions. 
To avoid different distortions, the definitions of gross incomes and expenses should be clearly 
stated and uniform for all sectors. Taxing profits in different sectors at different rates can 
cause economic inefficiencies and encourage tax avoidance/evasion as businesses attempt to 
take advantage of privileges and/or make false reports to reduce income tax obligations. 
Same as any other business, farming involves risk taking. If an entrepreneur is discouraged 
from undertaking a new risky activity or implementing know-how, the effect on the growth of 
the market economy can be extremely damaging. This is especially important in agriculture 
where profits can fluctuate from year to year more than in most other sectors due to weather. 
Therefore, the farm income tax system should provide the possibility for deducting net losses 
to finance potentially long-term profitable projects and/or ‘income averaging’ to ensure 
minimal fluctuations in the income tax burden. 
2.3. Value-added tax and agriculture 
Value added tax (VAT) is today the most important source of tax revenue in most countries, 
raising between 20 and 40% of total revenues2. The main feature of this tax, which 
distinguishes it from other taxes, is its wide base. Since the tax is based on consumption, 
revenues from VAT increase as consumption levels rise. If exemptions are few and the rate is 
uniform, the tax is neutral across different sectors of the economy. However, if there are too 
many exemptions, it erodes the tax base and discriminates among different sectors.  
The economic neutrality of the value-added tax means that this tax (if properly organised) 
does not significantly affect: 
- the consumers’ propensity to buy one or another type of goods and services, 
- the horizontal and vertical integration of production/trade, and  
- the territorial dispersion of production and trade within a given country. 
The VAT system creates incentives for self-control on the part of buyers and sellers. First, the 
credit for purchased inputs through the invoice mechanism encourages purchasers to demand 
invoices from sellers, thus preventing non-reporting or under-reporting of sales. While the 
seller is interested in showing as low a price as possible, the purchaser is interested in showing 
as high a price as possible, in order to get a higher input credit. This provides a cost effective 
‘self-policing mechanism’ and ensures better reporting and verifiable transaction records. 
                                                          
2 HIID/CASE (1998): The Importance of Value Added Tax in a Transition Economy. Ukrainian Project of the Harvard 
Institute for International Development and CASE with USAID, Kyiv. 
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In addition, the VAT links import activities with domestic marketing. If a farm imports inputs 
on which VAT is paid, it is then able to deduct the input VAT from the value added liable to 
taxation. This invoice system of VAT calculation, therefore, allows the costs of production and 
distribution to be reduced compared to other methods of VAT calculation. Moreover, it 
promotes equity among foreign and domestic entrepreneurs. 
Concerning the VAT rate, the imposition of VAT at a single positive rate on imports and 
domestic expenditure and at a zero rate on exports makes it administratively easy. Although 
theoretically the application of reduced VAT rates on basic goods and services does not 
influence tax neutrality very much because these goods/services do not compete with others 
and their demand is almost inelastic. In practice, however, a reduced rate of VAT applied to 
basic products will lower the tax burden for all groups of population (if they purchase these 
products) irrespective of their income, thus being regressive. Moreover, many income inelastic 
goods are price inelastic too; hence the distortions associated with taxing different 
commodities at different rates are greater than is often thought. 
In summary, this short analysis of the VAT demonstrates that unclear and/or unusual tax rules 
increase the cost of taxation and create many economic distortions. Promotion of standard 
rules and reasonable tax rates can help to avoid/reduce many of these distortions and 
contribute to create an efficient tax system. 
2.4. Land tax 
The government can tax agricultural land. The defenders of land taxation usually claim that 
this tax increases land use efficiency. This is especially relevant for transition economies where 
the transfer of land from less to more efficient farmers, who are able to pay higher taxes and 
offer higher purchase prices for land, is expected to contribute to growth in agriculture. 
Moreover, land taxation is often considered within the framework of regional policies and tax 
base mobility. Income tax, for instance, should be relatively uniform across all regions, 
otherwise people will over the long run move (themselves or their incomes) to lower tax 
regions. The same is true of most taxes, but not (or at least less so) of a land tax. Land is an 
immobile asset even in contrast to buildings or other facilities that can theoretically be moved 
elsewhere. A land tax, therefore, can be an important source of tax revenue for local 
administrations to finance government expenditures at the regional level. 
2.5. Fixed agricultural tax 
The consolidation of major taxes and social transfers into a single agricultural tax was first 
attempted in Ukraine in 1999. The single tax is also used in Poland, but that country has a 
radically different farm structure. As in Belarus, the principal agricultural producers in Ukraine 
are large-scale agricultural enterprises. In this context the Ukrainian experiment is unique and 
most relevant to our country. 
In 1999 the Verkhovna Rada introduced a fixed agricultural tax (FAT), which integrated twelve 
taxes previously paid by farm enterprises.3 The FAT resulted in a much lower tax burden, and 
in simplicity in calculating and collecting the tax. The FAT was introduced for a 5-year period 
(until 2004) and was prolonged until 2010 at the end of 2003. The tax revenue goes to the 
Pension Fund (68%), the Social Security Fund (2%), and local administrations (30%). 
FAT taxpayers are enterprises of different organisational and legal forms, which are involved 
with agricultural production and derive over 50% (over 70% since 2004) of their revenues 
from selling agricultural products. The base of the FAT is the value of an enterprise’s 
agricultural land as fixed on July 1, 1997. The land value is determined by using the quality 
and potential productivity characteristics of the land plots, and it differs therefore substantially 
between regions. The average land value in Ukraine for FAT purposes is UAH 8,733 per ha 
(USD 1650), with a maximum of UAH 11,297 in Cherkassy oblast (excluding Kyiv City, 
Sevastopil and Crimea) and a minimum of UAH 6,244 in Zhytomyr oblast.  
The tax rates are specified for two types of the agricultural land: (1) 0.5% of the value of 
arable land, haying, and pastures, and (2) 0.3% of the value of perennial plantations. In 
                                                          
3 The most important among them are land tax, profit tax, automobile tax, individual income tax, payments to the 
Pension, Social Security and Unemployment Funds, fee for the pollution of the environment, and communal tax. See 
Law of Ukraine “On Fixed Agricultural Tax” on December 17, 1998. 
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several regions, where the land to be considered is much less productive, for example, the 
Polissia zone or the Carpathians region, the tax rates are reduced to 0.3% and 0.1% 
respectively. The FAT is paid monthly, but the payment rates depend on the specific quarter. 
The tax payments are distributed among the quarters in the following way: in Q1– 10% of the 
annual tax payment, in Q2 – 10%, in Q3 – 50%, and in Q4 – 30%. 
The FAT is very low compared with the potential tax obligation of a farm if taxed under the 
normal tax regime of Ukraine. The estimated annual tax privilege equals roughly UAH 1400 m 
(USD 265 m).4 
The inter-sectoral effects of the FAT cannot be ignored. Exempting farm enterprises from profit 
tax will lead to a shift in employment from the more efficient services and manufacturing 
sectors to the less efficient agricultural sector. Additionally, favoured treatment of agricultural 
in contrast with non-agricultural production will encourage evasion by hiding non-agricultural 
production and services in rural areas. In other words, enterprises that are very profitable in 
activities outside of agriculture may be tempted to get involved in farming just to qualify as 
agricultural enterprises and benefit from lower taxation under the FAT. Furthermore, farming 
activities that do not use much land (for example some forms of livestock production) benefit 
disproportionately from the FAT. 
2.6. Other taxes 
Farmers may pay fees for environment pollution and for consuming natural resources. Farms, 
which produce and sell alcoholic beverages and beer, pay excises. Government can also tax 
real estate. In most countries these payments are not important compared with other taxes. 
Only payroll taxes to the Pension, Social Security, and Unemployment Funds reach 
considerable levels in many countries. Yet the “other taxes” article is very important for 
Belarus, because the number of such taxes and fees is quite large. 
3. The farm taxation system in Belarus 
From 1991 on, agricultural enterprises were made part of the general tax system of Belarus - 
with some exemptions. Basically, agricultural enterprises are obliged to pay a whole range of 
taxes. The important thing is that the production activities of farms must be divided into two 
parts for purposes of taxation: producing agricultural products (excluding flowers and 
ornamental plants), and other. The production of non-agricultural products is taxed in the 
same manner as that applying to firms in other sectors. Tax preferences apply to the 
agricultural production portion of the enterprises. Generally, an enterprise is considered to be 
agricultural if its agricultural production amounts to at least 50% of its output. 
Farms in Belarus pay about 20 different taxes and state fees. One possible classification of 
these taxes is given below. 
Taxes applying to price 
- Payments to the Republican Fund for Support of Agricultural and Food Producers and 
Agricultural Science. Applicable only to the non-agricultural production portion. 
- Tax on the sale of motor fuel. 50% of the tax paid is returned to the farms from the central 
road fund. 
- Excises, which are paid on a regular basis. 
- Fees for road use paid to the Road Fund. Agricultural production is exempted from this tax. 
- VAT. Applicable to non-agricultural products, VAT is paid on a regular basis at the rate of 
18% (prior to 01.01.2004 the rate was 20%). For agricultural products farms calculate the 
VAT at the rate of 9% but do not pay it to the state. Instead they are allowed to retain this 
sum to use for investment purposes. 
                                                          
4 According to SEROVA, the tax burden of Ukrainian farms decreased three times since 1997. (Serova, E., I. Khramov 
and V. Maslenkova: Agricultural Taxation in Russia. Institute for the Economy in Transition, Moscow, Russia, 
www.iet.ru.). 
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Taxes applying to costs 
- Emergency tax for recovery from the Chernobyl accident. The base of this tax is a wage 
fund, but the tax is not paid on agricultural products. The socio-cultural services provided 
by farms are also exempted from this tax. 
- Land tax. The only exemption from the land tax is that private farmers do not have to pay it 
during the first three years of activity. 
- Tax on the use of natural resources (below certain set limits). The tax is paid for acquiring 
natural recourses and for atmospheric and water pollution. The pumping of water for 
irrigation and fire fighting proposes is tax-exempted. 
Payroll taxes 
- Personal income tax. Until mid 1998 PIT was calculated at 9% (the lowest rate possible) of 
the overall wage fund of a collective farm. Thus farm managers had their high incomes 
taxed at an unfairly low rate. Since then the procedure of the PIT calculation and its 
payment by farms is the same as in all other sectors. 
- Contributions to the Social Protection Fund and contributions to the State Employment 
Fund. 
Taxes applied to farm income  
- Real estate tax. The base of the tax is the value of the net fixed assets of a farm. Fixed 
assets of a farm, which are used directly for production of agricultural products, are 
exempted. Other fixed assets including office buildings and equipment are taxed annually at 
the rate of 1% of the balance-sheet value, same as in other sectors. 
- Profit tax, corporate income tax. Farms pay profit tax on a regular basis. However, they are 
completely exempted from paying corporate income tax on income received from 
agricultural production. 
- Tax on purchased vehicles. Farms are exempted form paying this tax. 
- Local taxes and duties. The tax bases and rates depend on local legislation. Some of the 
local taxes are applied to the prices of products/services. 
- Tax on the use of natural resources (over the set limits). 
Unified Agricultural Tax 
The Unified Agricultural Tax (UAT) was introduced in 1999 by Presidential Decree #27. Any 
agricultural enterprise has a right to transfer to the UAT if the share of the agricultural 
products in its output during the preceding year was 70% or more. An enterprise can opt to 
pay UAT not only at the end of the year but also at the end of each quarter which makes the 
procedure very convenient for farms that wish to minimise their tax burden. The UAT 
eliminates almost all taxes except: 
- Excises, 
- VAT, 
- Profit tax (on interest and the like), 
- Licensing and registration fees, 
- Payroll taxes, and 
- Import tariffs. 
The base of the UAT is gross revenue, and the tax rate currently equals 2%. 2028 out of 2352 
agricultural enterprises (86%) in Belarus opted to pay UAT instead of regular taxes in 2003.  
The structure of government revenues from agriculture is presented in Table 1. Payroll taxes 
account for more than 45% of total revenues (60% in 2002). It can be argued that the 
economic rationale of payroll taxes is that employees contribute part of their incomes to the 
government to pay for social insurance and future pensions. Thus payroll taxes cannot be 
considered a contribution of the agricultural sector per-se to the government ‘pool’. Another 
important article is VAT (33% in 2003 and 18.6% in 2002), but as mentioned earlier, VAT is 
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levied only on the non-agricultural production of agricultural enterprises. Thus, the only 
significant tax on agricultural production is the UAT, which amounts to just 8.6% of the total 
government revenues from agriculture. Another 4% constitute the land and emergency taxes, 
and the tax on the use of natural resources. All together only about 15% of the amount of 
taxes and fees paid by State Agricultural Enterprises (SAEs) (or roughly BYR 55 bn) are taxes 
on purely agricultural production. Agriculture in Belarus pays a disproportionately low share of 
total tax revenues: only 3% compared to its 7.7% share in GDP. This demonstrates that tax 
exemptions for agriculture are huge, representing an implicit subsidy that is not visible in the 
state budget. 
Table 1. The structure of government revenue from agriculture in Belarus, 2003 
 
Amount 
due for 
payment 
(BYR m) 
Amount 
paid 
(BYR m) 
Ratio (%) 
Share of 
total 
revenue 
(%) 
1. Real estate tax 2766 2403 86.9 0.7 
2. Profit tax 4909 1854 37.8 0.5 
3. Income tax on legal entities  234 190 81.2 0.1 
4. Value-added tax 289668 119765 41.3 32.9 
5. Tax on the sale of motor fuel 856 806 94.2 0.2 
6. Payments to the Republican Fund for Support of Agricultural and 
Food Producers and Agricultural Science 
4511 4300 95.3 1.2 
7. Earmarked fees to local funds 7546 5545 73.5 1.5 
8. Excises 8851 7946 89.8 2.2 
9. Land tax 3889 3475 89.4 1.0 
10. Emergency tax for recovery from the Chernobyl accident 5149 5266 102.3 1.4 
11. Tax on the use of natural resources (within the set limits) 6880 5985 87.0 1.6 
12. Personal income tax 49066 42825 87.3 11.8 
13. Contributions to the Social Protection Fund and contributions to 
the State Employment Fund 
291200 123194 42.3 33.8 
14. Local taxes and duties 2102 1471 70.0 0.4 
15. Unified Agricultural tax 38156 31420 82.3 8.6 
16. Other taxes and duties 4974 3851 77.4 1.1 
17. Economic sanctions 4245 1654 39.0 0.5 
18. Contributions from the income of central government-owned 
enterprises 
715 769 107.6 0.2 
19. Innovation fund 1190 1718 144.4 0.5 
 Total  364437  100.0 
Source: The Institute of Agrarian Economy at National Academy of Science. 
Note: The numbers on the amount of taxes actually paid may include payments of tax debts from previous years. 
 
4. Main weaknesses of the current farm taxation system in Belarus 
Farming does not take place in isolation from the rest of the economy. Farm taxes affect the 
macroeconomic balance in the country through a number of channels, which are mostly 
invisible. Very often agriculture becomes the hostage of these invisible effects, because 
macroeconomic destabilisation does not spare farms. The most visible effect of farm taxes is 
their impact on state finances. Although this effect can be relatively small, the dynamic 
aspects in the long run certainly play a considerably larger role. Implicitly the farm tax system 
affects the other sectors of the economy and the macroeconomic balance. Moreover tax 
preferences may create obstacles to WTO accession. These issues are now considered in turn. 
1. Farm taxes have a direct impact on the Belarusian state budget. The total of all 
farm tax privileges in Belarus is large, equalling more than USD 200 m annually. In its 
negotiations on WTO membership, Belarus declared the value of its tax exemptions to 
agriculture to be USD 282.76 m (average for 1995-97)5. Farms paid approximately BYR 
364 bn in taxes and fees in 2003. Belarusian agriculture contributed 7.7% to the GDP in 
2003 but its share in total government revenues was just 3%. This means that agriculture 
is definitely getting a free ride at the expense of other sectors, and that other sectors are 
being indirectly taxed as a result. In the long run, agriculture should be expected to ‘pull its 
economic weight’. At the very least, subsidies to agriculture should be made transparent 
                                                          
5 Recommendations and proposals on the establishment of a common agrarian market among the CIS and the WTO 
issue: at http://www.aris.ru/WIN_E/TACIS/TACIS_2001/a/. 
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and visible in the budget to encourage an informed public debate; they should not be 
hidden in the form of an artificially low tax burden. 
2. The farm taxation system has spillover effects on other sectors. SAEs in Belarus are 
often quite large production entities. As a rule, their employees are engaged not only in 
purely agricultural production, but also in many other activities including repair of 
machinery, construction of farm facilities, processing and transporting products. They also 
work in the so-called ‘social sphere’: retail stores, canteens, kindergartens, and so on. Tax 
exemptions for agriculture seem to be the main obstacle for a division of labour in rural 
areas and the development of allied sectors. The tax burden on SAEs is low enough to 
make outsourcing for non-agricultural goods and services unattractive: it’s cheaper to 
produce everything within the farm. Upstream contractors, such as construction firms and 
firms that rent and repair machinery are taxed nearly the same as any other industrial or 
trade firm. Downstream contractors – processing factories – also pay higher taxes than 
SAEs do. As a result of this tax system, starting up their own processing lines – for 
example milk processing - has become very popular among SAEs lately. Farm-gate prices 
for raw milk are regulated and mostly too low to cover production costs. If a farm 
processes and then ships the milk straight to retail by itself, it gets twice as much for a liter 
and makes some profit. It turns out that the most profitable farms are those that have 
their own processing facilities. In this way, tax preferences to agricultural enterprises 
discourage the development of allied sectors - processing firms and firms that provide 
services to SAEs. 
3. VAT distortions. The problem just discussed - too much processing and production on 
farms in order to internalise transactions and avoid taxes - should not be a problem as far 
as the VAT is concerned. With the VAT a farm gets to net out the VAT paid on inputs 
against the VAT collected on outputs; hence it should make no difference whether a stage 
of production is internalized or not. But as we have already seen, farms do not pay VAT on 
agricultural products. It is only calculated (at half the normal rate: 9% instead of 18% at 
this time) and is then spent on investment items. In practice it is very difficult to ensure 
that farms do actually spend these sums on investment; to do so would require constant 
auditing by local and branch authorities. Even if the moneys are really spent on 
investments, SAEs have more funds left over for salaries. Therefore, in the Belarusian case 
VAT is not neutral and significantly affects the vertical integration of production. 
4. The UAT does not comply with the ‘ability to pay’ principle. The more profit a farm 
makes, the lower is its relative tax burden under the UAT. Tax systems are usually based 
on the principle of progressivity, whereby people and enterprises with higher incomes pay 
proportionately more than those with lower incomes. The UAT does not comply with this 
principle, as farms have to pay regardless of their profitability. About 60% of the SAEs 
were loss making at the end of 2003, but they have to pay the same percentage of their 
revenues as profitable farms. One argument for UAT is the relative simplicity of its 
calculation. Yet, to a large extent the accounting costs at a farm are fixed as long as VAT 
has to be calculated anyway, which is the most difficult procedure requiring a specialized 
accounting group. Belarusian SAEs are usually quite large and have such specialists. 
Indeed, farms that want to receive loans will have to be able to provide potential lenders 
with accurate and detailed accountings of revenues and costs; hence if they claim that they 
are not able to carry the accounting load necessary for an income-based tax, then they 
cannot reasonably expect to receive commercial loans either. 
5. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
Our assessment shows that although Belarusian farms pay many different taxes and fees, 
which often are difficult and expensive to calculate, tax exemptions for agriculture are large. 
The amount of this implicit subsidy is comparable to the subsidies shown in the state budget. 
It is therefore clear that agriculture is not pulling its weight within the Belarusian economy. 
The following steps could be taken to increase government revenues from agriculture. These 
steps would also help to reduce spillovers of tax preferences on other sectors. 
1. For the time being, the UAT should be obligatory. The simple procedure of switching 
to/from paying UAT creates unnecessary possibilities for rich farms to minimise their tax 
burdens.  
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2. SAEs should pay VAT for agricultural products as well. In many countries the rate of VAT 
for food is lower than for other products so it might be reasonable to maintain the current 
rate of 9% for food. Elimination of the VAT exemption for farms would encourage 
outsourcing and promote the division of labour, thus reducing inefficient employment on 
farms. 
3. SAEs should be given a clear perspective that within perhaps 5 to 10 years tax preferences 
including the UAT will be eliminated and agriculture will be taxed just like any other sector 
of the economy. This would provide farms with incentives to restructure and make 
production processes more efficient. The government could consider keeping the UAT for 
private farms only, which are often family-owned and operated, and are too small to afford 
specialized accounting services. 
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